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“WANT TO” VERSUS “HAVE TO”: 
INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC 
MOTIVATORS AS PREDICTORS 
OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR 
INTENTION
M A R C E L  H O F E D I T Z ,  A N N - M A R I E  N I E N A B E R ,  A N D E R S 
D Y S V I K ,  A N D  G E R H A R D  S C H E W E
 “Worthless,” “money burning,” or “black holes” is how media and professionals 
describe compliance practices today. Practitioners are unenthusiastic ab out con-
trol systems, codes of conducts, and systems for compliance management that 
are increasing in volume but not in effectiveness. In order to help practitioners 
clarify what actually makes employees comply with their compliance program, 
this study examines intrinsic and extrinsic motivators of 119 employees from 
procurement and sales. We contribute to the existing motivation literature, test-
ing the self-determination theory in low and high hierarchical levels. Our ﬁ nd-
ings show that intrinsic motivators are more strongly and positively related to 
compliance intention on higher hierarchical levels than the lower ones. How-
ever, employees from higher hierarchies show overall less compliance intention 
than employees from lower hierarchies. © 2015 The Authors. Human Resource 
Management published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
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P
ractitioners have raised concerns that their 
investments in compliance management 
systems have been ineffective. In a survey 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) in 2010, 45% of surveyed German 
executives reported that the beauraucratic control 
of compliance management worries them and 
43% of them mentioned that the benefits did not 
justify the effort. Explanations for these negative 
results could be that the compliance efforts have 
been predominantly legally driven, often not 
being more than a mere “window dressing” (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2006; Trullen & Stevenson, 2006) as well as 
ineffective, if the system has not been integrated 
into the company’s core activities (MacLean & 
Behnam, 2010; McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 
1996; Treviño, Gibson, Weaver, & Toffler, 1999). 
Although there is a dedicated compliance officer, 
who designs, implements, maintains, and reports 
compliance regulations (McKendall, DeMarr, & 
Jones-Rikkers, 2002), it is the HR department that 
supports the integration of compliance practices 
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The aftermath 
of large-scale 
compliance scandals 
(e.g., Enron in 
2001) initiated a 
compliance offense 
with full-blown 
compliance program 
implementations in 
not only major but 
also mid-sized and 
smaller corporations. 
Therefore, we are 
now able to go 
beyond the illustrated 
research state by 
empirically analyzing 
what actually 
motivates employees 
to comply with their 
compliance program 
(intrinsic vs. extrinsic) 
and how hierarchical 
organizations 
moderate this effect 
within organizations.
2008). Recent empirical studies have shown that 
intrinsic motivators are not only important but 
also more effective than extrinsic motivators in 
situations such as more complex work environ-
ments where direct incentive effects are more 
challenging to facilitate (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 
2014; Feldman, 2011; Frey et al., 2013; Gardner, 
2012).
Looking back in the compliance literature, 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivators have always 
been discussed as the central pairs of opposites 
until today: Paine in 1994 first conceptualized legal 
(extrinsic) versus integrity (intrinsic) as the two 
ethical cornerstones of compliance, both shaping 
the word and how it has been used in the litera-
ture. Weaver and Treviño (2001) then focused on 
the management of compliance activities distin-
guishing between a compliance-oriented (extrin-
sic) versus a value-oriented (integrity) approach. 
Finally, Stansburry and Barry (2007) proposed an 
enabling versus a coercive control, while Tyler and 
Blader (2005) suggested a command-and-control 
versus a self-regulation control of implemented 
compliance activities (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Since 
then, the aftermath of large-scale compliance 
scandals (e.g., Enron in 2001) initiated a compli-
ance offense with full-blown compliance program 
implementations in not only major but also mid-
sized and smaller corporations. Therefore, we are 
now able to go beyond the illustrated research 
state by empirically analyzing what actually moti-
vates employees to comply with their compliance 
program (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) and how hierar-
chical organizations moderate this effect within 
organizations. 
First, we are able to contribute to the compli-
ance literature by increasing our knowledge of the 
motivational sources behind employees’ compli-
ance behavior intention, including both extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation. The employee’s atti-
tude mediates all outcome beliefs for compliance 
intention except work impediment, which shows 
that employees act ethical as they are willing to 
accept more work if it is to ensure better compli-
ance standards. 
Second, we contribute to motivation research 
by testing the assumptions of SDT in different 
organizational hierarchies. Although intrinsic 
motivators are more efficient at the top manage-
ment level, our results also show that top man-
agers in general show significantly less compliant 
intention than employees from lower hierarchies. 
These two faces of the top management may indi-
cate that the incentive system promotes a “thrill 
of noncompliance,” which may ultimately alter 
the compliance behavior intention at the top 
management of the company.
into the company’s core processes (Farndale, 
Paauwe, & Boselie, 2010). Understanding the 
motivators that increase the degree of employee 
compliance to the rules and norms of an orga-
nization is therefore salient for effective human 
resource management (HRM) (Chow, Huang, & 
Liu, 2008; Gong & Janssen, 2012; 
see also Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & 
Treviño, 2010). 
The reason people are noncom-
pliant has often been approached 
from the viewpoint of traditional 
economic thought (Becker, 1968; 
Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). 
It is argued that the noncompliant 
behavior is the result of a rational 
decision based on a cost-benefit 
analysis by individuals (Braithwaite 
& Makkai, 1991; Ehrlich, 1972; 
Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Makkai & 
Braithwaite, 1994; Parker & Nielsen, 
2011b; Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996). Traditional economists often 
see sanctions as the most effective 
way to deter potential offenders 
(Williamson, 1975). Therefore, most 
of the time, core policies have aimed 
to scare off potential offenders by 
sanctions (e.g., fees, extra work). 
However, current studies show that 
control systems and sanctions are 
not only very difficult to introduce 
(Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Falk 
& Kosfeld, 2006; Lindenberg, 2001; 
Lindenberg & Foss, 2011) but also 
have little effect on compliance 
behavior (Braithwaite & Makkai, 
1991; Frey et al., 2013; Parker & 
Nielsen, 2011b). 
In the search for more promi-
nent influences on behavioral inten-
tions than solely external controls 
such as obtaining a desired reward 
or avoiding punishment, Deci 
and Ryan (1985) introduced self-
determination theory (SDT), which 
centers on intrinsic motivation as 
an autonomous motivation in its 
purest form in the absence of any 
extrinsic motivators. Intrinsic moti-
vation refers to doing an activity for 
its own sake because one finds the 
activity inherently interesting and satisfying. In 
contrast, extrinsic motivation, or controlled moti-
vation in its purest form, refers to doing an activ-
ity for an instrumental reason such as obtaining a 
reward or avoiding punishment (Gagné & Forest, 
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Self-determination 
suffers from the 
introduction of 
external controls, 
such as monetary 
incentives. As a 
consequence, 
individuals move 
their locus inside out, 
following their duty 
only when external 
incentives exist.
are three inherent psychological needs of each 
individual: autonomy, competence, and relat-
edness. The experience and fulfillment of self-
determination and competence needs play an 
important role while determining intrinsic moti-
vation. The concept of competence sees individu-
als pursuing an action in order to receive a reward 
feeling of efficacy (effectance motivation) when 
interacting with the environment (White, 1959). 
The autonomy concept sees the individual seeking 
responsibility for his own behavior, to be a causal 
agent, the primary locus of causation (deCharms, 
1968). This internal locus of causality is extremely 
sensible to behavioral influences and external 
causes. Self-determination suffers from the intro-
duction of external controls, such as monetary 
incentives. As a consequence, individuals move 
their locus inside out, follow-
ing their duty only when external 
incentives exist. The third need is 
the need for relatedness, or feeling 
connected to others, and refers to 
caring for and being cared for by 
others as well as having a sense of 
belongingness to groups, communi-
ties, or organizations (Ryan & Deci, 
2002). Experiencing satisfaction of 
this need plays an important role in 
the internalization of work-related 
rules and regulations (Gagné & 
Deci, 2005).
Compliance behavior is the atti-
tude toward and intention to fol-
low a given set of rules or norms of 
an individual’s environment (Lu, 
Sadiq, & Governatori, 2008). Such 
rules and regulations are expressed 
within all compliance efforts that 
aim to ensure that the management 
as well as the company’s employ-
ees behave lawfully (for an overview, see Pinto, 
Leana, & Pil, 2008). Integrating the compliance 
and motivation literature by applying SDT cen-
ters the compliance behavior on the autonomy of 
the individual as the driver of motivation. In this 
regard, intrinsic motivators increase compliance 
motivation, while extrinsic motivators (e.g., con-
trol) reduce noncompliance motivation.
Within SDT, Deci and Ryan (1985) introduced 
the compliance-relevant organismic integration 
theory, which explains situational factors that 
either hinder or promote internalization of the 
regulation of, for example, the individual’s orga-
nization. Internalization happens when regula-
tions are aligned with one’s own needs and values 
and, hence, are completely assimilated to oneself. 
Internalized extrinsic motivated actions share 
On the basis of our results, we intend to give 
evidence-based advice to the field of HRM by 
extending our knowledge of how to implement 
compliance management practices more effec-
tively. In particular, we discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages for practitioners to adapt or not 
adapt the compliance program hierarchically, pay-
ing attention to intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.
Theory and Hypotheses
Motivation and Compliance Theory
The psychological motivation literature has pre-
dominantly focused on explaining the direction, 
persistence, and intensity of projected behavior 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). The literature differentiates 
between two types of motivation theories: con-
tent and process theories. Process theory such 
as the theory of planned behavior (TPB) focuses 
on integrating personal and contextual factors, 
which allows for an effective selection of differ-
ing alternatives of actions (Deci & Ryan, 2000), 
whereas a content theory (e.g., SDT) encompasses 
individual (personal factors) and contextual moti-
vators (situation factors). A motivator is a con-
struct that may cause differing anticipations and 
evaluations of consequences of actions (e.g., posi-
tive or negative) (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Motivators 
can be divided into extrinsic and intrinsic motiva-
tors (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Extrinsic motivating 
behavior is implicit behavior that originates from 
external contingencies such as pressure (Gardner, 
2012) or tangible, monetary rewards (Peterson 
& Luthans, 2006). In contrast, intrinsic motiva-
tion entails behaviors motivated in “the absence 
of any apparent external contingency” (Deci & 
Ryan, 1980, p. 42). Broadly speaking, this intrinsic 
and autonomous motivation is based on the moti-
vation to pursue norms for their own sake (Gagné 
& Deci, 2005). Process theory has often built on 
the so-called expectancy value theorem, which 
basically argues that one chooses the product that 
maximizes the probability of achieving a target 
value (motivator) in combination with the value 
of this target. In combining TPB and SDT in this 
article, we ensure both process and content view 
of compliance behavior intention.
SDT is one of the most prominent frame-
works for defining intrinsic motivation among 
the numerous theories of motivation that can be 
found in the social psychology literature (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985, 2000; Grant, Nurmohamed, Ashford, 
& Dekas, 2011). SDT predominantly deals with 
contingencies that increase or decrease autono-
mous motivation and has received considerable 
empirical support (for a more elaborate presenta-
tion, see Gagné & Deci, 2005). At the core of SDT 
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Several researchers have investigated the influ-
ence of compliance management on actual behav-
ior. As presented in Table I, there are basically 
four major pairs of opposites describing compli-
ance behavior: (1) legal vs. integrity, (2) compli-
ance vs. value, (3) coercive vs. enabling, and (4) 
command-and-control vs. self-regulation. All four 
approaches derive their opposites from extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivators. 
Paine (1994) has been first in discussing the 
relevant division of corporate compliance and 
ethics (for a review, see Michaelson, 2006). She 
considers ethics in her pivotal work as the “driv-
ing force” of a company that defines “what the 
company is” and “what it stands for” (Paine, 
1994, p. 111), while compliance is referred to as a 
specific approach, strategy, or policy. Paine (1994) 
claims the compliance orientation of companies is 
inadequate for exemplary conduct, since compli-
ance serves only to prevent violations of the law. 
Instead, she recommends pursuing an approach of 
integrity and moral values, emphasizing strategies 
that go beyond a mere “legalistic” punishment 
and control-oriented compliance. In this way, 
ethics go beyond compliance (Maignan, Ferrell, & 
Hult, 1999; Norman, 2011). On the other hand, 
legal and economic responsibilities are subject 
to compliance management but shall always be 
considered in ethical management, too (Carroll, 
1979, 1991). 
Concerning the implementation of compli-
ance programs, research findings indicate that 
value-oriented implementation based on self-
direction and social values is more effective than 
(formal legal) compliance-oriented implemen-
tation based on controls and penalties (Adam 
& Rachman-Moore, 2004; Treviño et al., 1999; 
Weaver & Treviño, 1999). Stansburry and Barry 
(2007) investigated the different types of compli-
ance control. In their research they differentiate 
between coercive (destructive) and enabling (con-
structive) control. Tyler and Blader (2005) found 
that a control-oriented approach is effective but 
could be improved by a self-regulatory approach, 
It is through 
internalization that 
individuals may 
become authentic 
and committed while 
following extrinsically 
motivated actions. 
For instance, 
when individuals 
focus on the well-
being of others, 
they anticipate no 
compensation.
many characteristics with intrinsic motivation. 
However, they remain extrinsic since they aim at 
discrete outcomes instead of innate enjoyment. 
But SDT distinguishes that extrinsically motivated 
actions may also convert in being self-determined 
when individuals start identifying with their 
completely assimilated regulations. Therefore, it 
is through internalization that individuals may 
become authentic and committed while follow-
ing extrinsically motivated actions. For instance, 
when individuals focus on the well-
being of others, they anticipate no 
compensation. In this case, the com-
munity’s benefit enters the individ-
ual’s preferences (Frey et al., 2013), 
which is a prerequisite of organiza-
tional citizenship behavior (OCB).
Compliance behavior can be 
described as a subform of OCB 
(for an overview, see Podsakoff, 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Maynes, 
& Spoelma, 2014). As such, com-
pliance behavior helps to create 
OCB’s psychological and social 
environment that finally influ-
ences task performance. Van Dyne, 
Cummings, and Parks (1995) differ-
entiate between two types of OCB: 
challenge-oriented and affiliation-
oriented. Whilst challenge-oriented 
behavior is described as behaviors 
that challenge the status quo that 
emphasizes expression of construc-
tive challenge, often with the goal to 
create something new (e.g., through 
change or innovation), compliance behavior is 
an affiliation-oriented OCB due to its coopera-
tive and interpersonal nature: being compliant 
strengthens or maintains relationships with other 
people through adjusting or integrating a given set 
of rules (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). It 
can mean speaking up to others in order to pre-
vent the occurrence of noncompliance (Podsakoff 
et al., 2014). 
T A B L E  I  Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivators in the Compliance Literature
Compliance Approach Extrinsic Motivator Intrinsic Motivator
Ethic approach (Paine, 1994) Legal compliance Integrity
Implementation of compliance man-
agements (Weaver & Treviño, 2001)
(Legal) compliance-oriented Value-oriented
Type of control (Adler & Borys, 1996; 
Stansbury & Barry, 2007)
Coercive control Enabling control
Steering of correct behavior in the 
company (Tyler & Blader, 2005)
Command-and-control 
approach
Self-regulation approach
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
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The definition of 
intrinsic motivators is 
important. Depending 
on the conceptual 
bases, intrinsic 
aspects may be well 
integrated into a 
model of economic 
behavior.
and not due to changes of preferences. Thus, the 
definition of intrinsic motivators is important. 
Depending on the conceptual bases, intrinsic 
aspects may be well integrated into a model of 
economic behavior (see, for example, Harbaugh, 
1998; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). In addi-
tion, when intrinsic motivators are 
excluded, pure extrinsic incentive 
mechanisms may cause negative 
effects such as the control paradox 
and the crowding-out effect (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001).
Hypotheses
As shown in Figure 1 and Table II, 
our conceptual model includes both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivators 
in line with SDT (Gagné & Deci, 
2005). We thereby recognize the rel-
evance of extrinsic motivators like 
sanctions, as well as the relevance 
of intrinsic motivators like intrin-
sic costs. We assume that these 
costs may also include any benefits 
of complying (e.g., rewards) or not complying 
(e.g., “thrill”) that may be perceived as relevant 
increase or decrease in the costs of compliance or 
noncompliance by the employee. As such, we sug-
gest that both extrinsic and intrinsic costs predict 
which relies on legitimacy and value congruence 
between employees and a company. They identify 
different determinants of steering correct behav-
ior in a company depending on whether a com-
pany follows a command-and-control approach 
(focus on extrinsic motivation) or a self-regula-
tory approach. Our study attempts to build upon 
but also go beyond the present state of the litera-
ture by empirically measuring what factors drive 
employees to comply with their compliance pro-
gram and which role plays the hierarchy within 
the organization. After a “compliance wave” 
with comprehensive compliance program imple-
mentations, we are now able to actually test the 
motivators that increase the employee’s compli-
ance intention with the compliance program of 
not only major but also mid-sized and smaller 
organizations.
Indeed, traditional economic behavior mod-
els have been based on concepts that solely rely 
on incentives of extrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997). 
Intrinsic motivation is not considered irrelevant 
in economic approaches, but is perceived as a 
given exogenous constant (Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
Economists have justified this approach by treat-
ing intrinsic motivators as elements of morality 
and moving them to the realm of preferences 
(Frey, 1997). However, behavioral changes are 
always explained due to changes of restrictions 
Note: Control variables are gender, company size, hierarchy, age, and industry.
FIGURE 1. Overview of Hypothetical Model of Compliance Behavior
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H3c+
H4a+
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T A B L E  I I  Overview of Constructs, Deﬁ nitions, and Sources
Level Construct Deﬁ nition Source
Main  construct Compliance 
 intention
The individual probability that a person 
 complies to the compliance management
Ajzen (1991)
Compliance 
intention
Attitude toward 
compliance
Measures in how far an individual evaluates 
positively the compliance behavior
Ajzen (1991)
Normative beliefs Belief of person that important colleagues in his 
environment shall comply to the compliance 
management
Ajzen (1991)
Self-efﬁ cacy to 
comply
Measures how much an individual has the capa-
bilities, knowledge, and competences to comply 
with the compliance management
Ajzen (1991)
Costs of 
 compliance 
and 
 noncompliance
Perceived cost of 
compliance
Overall perceived negative consequences that 
an individual expects when complying with the 
compliance management
Bulgurcu et  al. 
(2010)
Perceived cost of 
noncompliance
Overall perceived negative consequences that 
an individual expects when not complying with 
the compliance management
Bulgurcu et  al. 
(2010)
Extrinsic 
 motivators
Sanctions Formal, tangible and intangible sanctions that 
an individual expects when not complying with 
the compliance management
Boss & Kirsch 
(2007)
Perceived  detection 
of behavior
Perceived intensity of employee observation of 
the boss
Tyler & Blader 
(2005)
Work impediment Perceived impediment of daily work task and 
activities of the individual when complying with 
the compliance management
Bulgurcu et  al. 
(2010)
Intrinsic moti-
vators
Intrinsic costs Perceived negative outcome that an individual 
relates to himself when not complying with the 
compliance management
Bulgurcu et  al. 
(2010)
compliance behavior. In addition, we align our 
model with the theory of planned behavior (TPB). 
TPB proposes that individuals have a general idea 
about the consequences (i.e., costs of compliance 
or noncompliance behavior). The evaluation of 
the costs is determined by general ideas about 
the negative as well as positive consequences of 
individual behaviors, and based on these per-
ceived outcomes, the individual develops an atti-
tude toward behaviors more generally speaking 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001) and in our study spe-
cifically to compliance behavior. 
Compliance Intention
Recent studies have used TPB to explain informa-
tion security compliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, 
& Benbasat, 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Hu, 
Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Pahnila, Siponen, & 
Mahmood, 2007). According to TPB, the compli-
ance behavior of individuals can be explained by 
behavioral intention, which is particularly appro-
priate to explain the underlying motivation for 
compliance (Ajzen, 1991) since, in a compliance 
context, the intention to comply may reflect a 
rational state of mind, which in turn may affect 
the actual behavior in situations where the indi-
vidual has to decide to comply or not to comply 
(Becker, 1968). Compliance intention is deter-
mined by three variables: (1) attitude toward the 
compliance behavior measures in terms of the 
degree to which individuals evaluate compliance 
behavior positively; (2) normative beliefs, which 
measure the person’s judgment as to whether 
close colleagues would stick to compliance man-
agement requirements; and (3) self-efficacy, which 
is ultimately defined as a measure of the extent 
to which an individual has the skills, knowledge, 
and competencies to adhere to compliance man-
agement requirements; that is, it describes the 
ease or difficulty with which the individual com-
plies (Ajzen, 1991). According to TPB, the greater 
these three determinants are, the higher the 
intention. Self-efficacy in this regard tests whether 
the compliance program and training help to 
increase the knowledge and skills that enable all 
employees to fulfill the program’s requirements. 
Self-efficacy is the activator for one’s own locus of 
control. It means to be able to autonomously act 
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Although the 
noncompliant activity 
is kept secret, 
individuals may 
perceive themselves 
negatively (self-
image, self-esteem) 
in the short term 
and may become 
depressive in the 
long term when 
they do not comply 
with compliance 
management.
reaction, companies may either decrease the costs 
of compliance (e.g., via less bureaucracy or more 
compliance rewards) or increase the costs of non-
compliance (e.g., via more penalties or a less risky 
business culture to avoid any “thrill” of noncom-
pliance). According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), 
it is assumed that the belief about the costs of the 
behavior influences the attitude. Thus, we assume:
Hypothesis 2: The attitude toward compliance behavior 
mediates the relationship between (a) perceived costs 
of compliance and (b) perceived cost of noncompliance 
and compliance intention.
Perceived Cost of Noncompliance
The perceived cost of noncompliance is defined 
as the total expected negative consequences for 
an individual when she or he does 
not adhere to the requirements of 
compliance management (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010). These costs may occur 
from beliefs about (1) intrinsic costs, 
(2) sanctions. and (3) perceived 
behavioral detection. First, intrin-
sic costs refer to negative feelings 
for an individual when she or he 
does not comply with compliance 
management, for example, because 
of an innate disagreement with the 
given set of rules that do not align 
with one’s own needs and norms 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005). Besides for-
mal deterrence mechanisms (e.g., 
sanctions or penalties), there are 
informal deterrence mechanisms 
that create costs of noncompliant 
activity (Cohen & Simpson, 1997; 
Paternoster & Simpson, 1993). 
These include feelings of shame or 
loss of respect from the individual’s 
peers that may hurt more than for-
mal sanctions (Grasmick & Bursik, 
1990). Empirical studies show that 
informal aspects can better explain compliance 
and noncompliance than formal deterrence alone 
(Parker & Nielsen, 2011b; Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996). Although the noncompliant activity is 
kept secret, individuals may perceive themselves 
negatively (self-image, self-esteem) in the short 
term and may become depressive in the long term 
when they do not comply with compliance man-
agement (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). These costs 
may also be high because the individual may 
have an inner positive feeling related to compli-
ance, for example, satisfaction, interest, or even 
joy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
and speak for oneself due to the feeling of being 
competent regarding the compliance rules (Deci 
& Ryan, 1985). Therefore, if employees feel that 
they are able to achieve the compliance targets, 
they are more likely to be compliant. In addition, 
employees who believe that their close colleagues 
will stick to the compliance program may show 
higher compliance intention than those who 
believe that their colleagues will not stick to the 
compliance program (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
Besides telling about one’s own subjective norm, 
the perceived attitude of other colleagues toward 
rules may show that compliance can be perceived 
as a collective activity (Pinto et al., 2008): If the 
collective relevance of compliance decreases, it 
may hinder internalization since collective non-
compliance may be the cause of individual non-
compliance and, therefore, reduce the intention 
to be compliant. We assume:
Hypothesis 1: The attitude (a), the normative belief (b), 
and the self-efﬁ cacy (c) concerning compliance behav-
ior are positively related to the intention to adhere to 
the compliance management requirements.
Costs of Compliance and Noncompliance 
Mediated by the Attitude toward Compliance 
Behavior
Following Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), the adjust-
ment to the individual compliance behavior is a 
function of behavioral beliefs (Ajzen, 1991, 2005; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In a compliance con-
text, this means that individuals attribute specific 
consequences to behavior. To make this clear, the 
rational characteristics of white-collar crimes pro-
vide a strong backbone for the use of our applied 
rational choice model of compliance motivation 
as an exploratory mechanism. In our model, there 
are two behavioral options: compliance or non-
compliance. Individuals attribute costs regarding 
consequences to both behaviors. Attitude acts in 
this case as a cost mediator. In this model, there 
are two alternatives: the perceived cost of compli-
ance and the perceived costs of noncompliance 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Parker & Nielsen, 2011b). 
These costs are the results of a calculus weighing 
positive and negative consequences. In a compli-
ance context, the perceived costs of compliance 
may overweigh the perceived costs of noncompli-
ance, which is often seen in contexts of fraud or 
corruption where top management ex-post justify 
their noncompliant behavior, arguing that they 
wanted to “save” the company and, particularly, 
their employees and decided to risk the per-
ceived personal costs (e.g., image loss or even jail) 
they might face (Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014). As a 
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Perceived Cost of Compliance
The perceived cost of compliance is defined as 
the total expected negative consequences for an 
individual who conforms to compliance require-
ments. These costs may be predominantly shaped 
by extrinsic work impediments. A perceived work 
impediment is defined as a perceived disability in 
carrying out the everyday professional tasks and 
activities of a person if they conform to compli-
ance management requirements (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). Introducing a compliance system comes 
with an increased documentation and reporting 
of compliance action. A compliance management 
system may contain certain provisions that lead 
to increased bureaucracy, which in turn leads to 
time-consuming decisions. This impairment of 
routine work is perceived by workers as a cost of 
compliance. The work impediment may be per-
ceived as a high cost due to a gain of efficiency 
that comes with noncompliance. This efficiency 
gain may even lead to a positive feeling of doing 
something more efficient than the rest, who 
are still following the rules. The increased work 
impediment is assumed to relate negatively to the 
attitude to the compliance program. Employees 
are expected to associate negative feelings and 
thoughts due to the increased bureaucracy that 
may negatively influence their attitude toward 
the compliance program. Accordingly, the follow-
ing hypothesis is examined: 
Hypothesis 4: The perceived work impediment is posi-
tively related to the overall cost of compliance (a), 
which is negatively related to the attitude toward com-
pliance behavior (b).
The Moderating Role of Hierarchical Level 
According to the organizational contingency liter-
ature (e.g., Johns, 2006), organizational level may 
determine the extent to which compliance prac-
tices influence compliance behavior. More specifi-
cally, each organizational level provides different 
contextual perceptions of the same organization 
(Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002), shaped 
by the person’s access to resources and social iden-
tification that come along as artifacts depending 
on the hierarchical level a person has (Begley, 
Lee, & Hui, 2006). Resource theory sees individu-
als defined by their access to resources within an 
organization, due to which there may be greater 
autonomy and less need for extrinsic controls at 
higher hierarchical levels (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
Instead, employees at higher levels are assumed 
to be more intrinsically concerned about effective 
resource allocation, while at lower levels people’s 
For instance, it may be possible that compliance 
behavior may lead to the positive feeling of civic 
virtue rather free from external influences (Deci & 
Ryan, 1980). However, if the compliance motiva-
tion is to gain prestige, then it would be an extrin-
sic motivation (Harbaugh, 1998). 
Second, formal sanctions are tangible or 
intangible penalties that a person receives from 
the company if they do not adhere to the require-
ments of compliance management, such as fines 
or reduced bonus payments (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). The traditional theory of deterrence posits 
to influence the rationality of individuals through 
sanctions so that the cost of noncompliance is suf-
ficiently high to make noncompliance no longer 
profitable (Becker, 1968). These sanctions may also 
be perceived high due to an operational incentive 
system that intends to promote the desired behav-
iors of compliance (Becker, 1968). Those indirect 
sanctions (i.e., rewards) are often used as posi-
tive incentive mechanisms in economic theories 
(Frey, 1997). In the context of economic crime, 
empirical studies show that formal sanctions 
have no or partial positive effect on compliance 
behavior (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1991; Makkai 
& Braithwaite, 1994; Parker & Nielsen, 2011a). 
However, the general ineffectiveness of formal 
sanctions is not yet definitively proven concern-
ing economic crimes. Tyler and Blader (2005) con-
firm the command-and-control approach to be 
partially effective. Thus, there is a need to exam-
ine whether extrinsic control mechanisms such as 
sanctions increase the costs of noncompliance by 
using the rational choice approach. 
The perceived uncovering of the behavior of 
the individual is defined as the perceived intensity 
with which the individual’s behavior is observed 
by the line manager (Tyler & Blader, 2005). In 
many models, there is a similar construct, namely, 
the probability that the noncompliant behavior is 
detected, which also affects the individual’s cost 
calculation (Herath & Rao, 2009; Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996). To uncover compliance behav-
ior, employers usually use control and monitoring 
mechanisms, which belong to the extrinsically 
oriented command-and-control approach, and 
generate compliant behavior (Tyler & Blader, 
2005). It is therefore likely that individuals will 
perceive behavioral controls as a cost of noncom-
pliance (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 3: The (a) perceived behavioral detection, 
(b) intrinsic costs, and (c) sanctions positively relate to 
the perceived overall costs of noncompliance, which in 
turn (d) is positively related to the attitude toward com-
pliance.
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Employees at higher 
levels are assumed to 
be more intrinsically 
concerned about 
effective resource 
allocation, while 
at lower levels 
people’s focus lies on 
following compliance 
procedures under 
extrinsic obligations 
when constrained to 
pursue more intrinsic 
motives.
procurement. These areas are especially sensitive 
toward compliance violations due to cooperation 
with many business partners, which may increase 
the risk of corruption (Harland, Brenchley, & 
Walker, 2003). As a result, the presence of com-
pliance management, for example, in the form of 
anticorruption management, is more probable in 
these departments.
In order to reduce the influence of potential 
biases due to the sensitivity of the topic (e.g., 
social desirability bias), we decided to ensure a 
maximum of anonymity by obtaining suitable 
study participants from the online business net-
work XING. Anonymity is central for a successful 
questionnaire with a sensitive topic since in com-
pany settings, we experienced (during interviews 
and other projects) that employees 
are often afraid of possible conse-
quences regarding their individual 
answers to compliance issues and 
therefore respond in a socially desir-
able fashion. We assume that the 
tendency of respondents to answer 
questions in a manner that will be 
viewed favorably by others (i.e., their 
colleagues) may be small since the 
questionnaire has not been issued 
or distributed by the company via 
the internal mail system. Instead, 
participants have been contacted 
on their private business profile, 
which is often used as an oppor-
tunity to express the respondent’s 
individuality. We made it clear from 
the beginning that this survey is 
absolutely anonymous and results 
are presented only in an aggregated 
manner. We think overreporting of 
“good behavior” or underreporting 
“bad” or undesirable behavior can 
be assumed to be low.
On the other hand, while online 
networks or databases form a more 
suitable environment for people to respond to 
sensitive topics such as compliance, online sur-
veys bear the risk of self-selection bias. We assume 
that this bias is rather low for the following rea-
sons: First, XING is well suited to represent the 
entire population since it is Germany’s biggest 
business network, with 5.5 million members. In 
addition, XING is used not only for career progress 
HR (81%) or external communication (73%) but 
also for sales (29%). There is reason to assume that 
employees in procurement and sales are highly 
represented in this biggest German business net-
work. Our sample reflects the composition of the 
population as described by the Federal Statistical 
focus lies on following compliance procedures 
under extrinsic obligations when constrained to 
pursue more intrinsic motives. Employees from 
higher hierarchies have their own goals necessar-
ily aligned to the goals of the organization due 
to their increased commitment related to the 
positive career progress (Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 
2010). Any extrinsic alignments such as bonus 
payments or incentive payments are from an 
SDT perspective for higher hierarchies perceived 
as extrinsic and, therefore, may harm rather than 
help. These extrinsic payments may be counter-
productive and distort any intrinsic behavior of 
highly intrinsically motivated top managers (Rost 
& Weibel, 2013). 
Furthermore, social identity theory views the 
individual as social and states that people define 
their identities at least partly based on their status 
within their groups and organizations (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). At higher levels, authority is there-
fore considered to be an element of social status 
(e.g., Tyler, 1999) that differentiates members of 
higher levels from members of lower levels. The 
danger of losing such authority through unfair 
behavior is, therefore, assumed to be rather high 
(Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Van 
den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). People at higher 
levels are therefore intrinsically motivated to 
maintain their authority being an archetype for 
their subordinates. Extrinsic motivators may dis-
tort this particular intrinsically driven behavior. 
Conversely, at lower levels people possess less 
authority and have less reason to fear a loss of 
image and authority. We therefore hypothesize 
the following:
Hypothesis 5: At higher organizational levels the rela-
tionship between employees’ compliance intention and 
intrinsic motivation is more positive than is the cor-
responding relationship at lower organizational levels.
Hypothesis 6: At lower organizational levels the rela-
tionship between employees’ compliance motivation 
and extrinsic motivation is more positive than the cor-
responding relationship at higher organizational levels.
Methodology
Data Collection and Sampling
The data were collected through an anonymous 
online survey using a standardized questionnaire 
during the period December 2012 to February 
2013. The survey was conducted among employ-
ees at all levels of organizations in the functional 
areas of distribution and sales, and purchasing and 
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no significant differences with respect to response 
behavior between the two groups. Based on this, it 
seems less likely that a nonresponse bias has influ-
enced our results. This is important to mention 
since a nonresponse bias could be an indicator for 
a self-selection bias, which means that people that 
answer fast (positive attitude toward the topic) 
may be a good proxy for self-selector (also posi-
tive attitude toward the topic). Therefore, we sta-
tistically imply that nonresponse bias may be also 
used in our study as a proxy for self-selection bias, 
which we assume to be of lesser importance.
Finally, since the measurement of latent depen-
dent and independent variables is only done by a 
single method within a specific context (online 
survey), and since these measurements were 
obtained from the answers of each person to the 
same questions, common method bias could play 
a role (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
First, a series of measures are applied in order to 
avoid such distortions, such as the assurance that 
the survey will be analyzed anonymously and that 
there is no “correct attitude” or “wrong answers” 
using different scales (Likert scale, semantic differ-
ential) and a careful selection of indicators and use 
of words. Furthermore, we empirically checked 
the data of any common method bias following 
Williams, Edwards, and Vandenberg (2003). Here, 
a latent method construct is used in second order, 
which includes all the indicators of the model 
generated; and all indicators are converted into 
single-indicator constructs (first-order constructs) 
(Williams et al., 2003). Then, the variance of the 
single-indicator constructs is compared with the 
variance explained by the methods construct. In 
this case, the average variance explained by the 
substantive constructs (0.873) is much greater 
than the variance explained by the method fac-
tor (0.010). The loadings of the single-indicator 
constructs and the methods construct (second-
order construct) are mostly not significant. It can 
be cautiously concluded that a common method 
bias does not seem to influence our observations 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Construct Measurement
We analyzed our data in a structural equa-
tion model by using the software smart PLS3. 
Advantages of the PLS approach over the covari-
ant approach are mainly that even smaller sample 
sizes are sufficient to achieve meaningful model 
results, and that the PLS approach has less restric-
tive distributional assumptions (Marcoulides, 
Chin, & Saunders, 2009; McIntosh, Edwards, & 
Antonakis, 2014; Rönkkö & Evermann, 2013). 
Based on the questionnaire of Jarvis, MacKenzie, 
Office: (1) fewer employees in senior management 
than in middle and lower management; and (2) 
men are more numerous than women, which is 
particularly related to the purchasing and sales 
profession, since the latter is a “classic men’s 
domain” (Funken, 2004). 
Taking into account these conditions, we con-
tacted 400 persons via XING and invited them to 
participate in this study. From participants’ ques-
tionnaires, cases that had completed less than 75% 
of the questions were eliminated. We also asked 
each respondent if he or she has a compliance pro-
gram and if he or she is aware of its content. The 
hypotheses in this study could not be examined 
with participants who were completely unaware 
of the existence or the requirements of their com-
pliance program, or who did not work under the 
rules of compliance programs. We excluded no 
respondents because every employee had a com-
pliance program installed in their company.
We also deleted 19 cases that did not work in 
procurement and sales. In terms of how to deal 
with missing data, we decided to use the expec-
tancy maximization algorithm as suggested by 
Newman (2014), which resulted in a final sample 
size of 119 people and a response rate of 29.75% 
(see also Myers, 2011; Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
Half of the sample worked in procurement 
(47.1%) and the other half in sales (52.9%). The 
average age of the participants in our sample was 
40 years, and there were more male (72.3%) than 
female (27.7%) participants. The most frequently 
reported industries were the manufacturing sector 
(13.4%), information and communication (8.4%), 
financial and insurance services (6.7%), and retail 
(5.9%). The majority of respondents worked in 
large companies with more than 250 employees 
(77.3%). People who worked in smaller businesses 
(51–250 employees) made up 15.1% of the sample. 
The rest of the participants worked in very small 
businesses (European Commission, 2009). Slightly 
more than half of the participants (50.4%) worked 
in the lowest of three levels of hierarchy in the 
company, 34.8% in the medium, and 14.8% in 
the upper management level.
In addition, given the response rate, we exam-
ined whether our data could be influenced by 
nonresponse bias (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
We performed a t-test to check if the mean val-
ues were significantly different between the 
groups “early responders” and “late responders.” 
Late responders are defined as persons who took 
part before the last “wave,” that is, after send-
ing the last personal messages (13 participants). 
This group was compared to the first 13 partici-
pants (representing approximately the first and 
last 10%). The results of these analyses showed 
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extrinsic motivators and measured as follows, 
which can be attributed as being costs or benefits 
of compliance/noncompliance. Here, the satisfac-
tory alpha is 0.94.
Costs of Compliance and Noncompliance 
The perceived cost of compliance was measured by 
asking participants how time consuming, burden-
some, and costly it would be to comply with the 
compliance practice (satisfactory alpha of 0.88). 
Finally, perceived cost of noncompliance was mea-
sured by asking each participant if not complying 
with the compliance practice would be harmful 
in terms of having a negative impact or being dis-
advantageous for him/her. The Cronbach’s alpha 
shows 0.97. 
Intrinsic Motivators 
Intrinsic costs were measured by asking the par-
ticipant if not complying with the compliance 
rules would make him/her feel bad, dissatisfied, 
or a sense of a lack of accomplishment. Intrinsic 
costs reached a satisfactory alpha of 0.92.
Extrinsic Motivators
Extrinsic sanctions were measured by asking the 
participant if he/she perceives it probable that he/
she will be punished or demoted or receive an oral 
or written personal reprimand or monetary or 
nonmonetary penalties as the result of not com-
plying with compliance management require-
ments. The satisfactory alpha is 0.88. Extrinsic 
work impediment was measured by asking the 
participant if conforming to the requirements of 
the compliance practice would hold him/her back 
from doing the actual work, slow down response 
times, or hinder productivity. The alpha is 0.96. 
Extrinsic behavior detection was measured by ask-
ing participants about their perception of how 
much attention and care the supervisor pays to 
making them comply with the compliance prac-
tice. Here, the satisfactory alpha is 0.76. 
Hierarchy Moderator
Hierarchy as a control variable was measured as 
a categorical variable, asking participants if they 
belonged to a low, medium, or high hierarchical 
level. 
Contextual Control Variables
Organizational research has frequently been criti-
cized for neglecting the role of contextual factors 
(e.g., Bamberger, 2008). To address that critique 
and to make our results robust across contexts, we 
included a range of contextual variables including 
age, gender, company size, function, and indus-
try (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Gender (female 
and Podsakoff (2003), all constructs can be speci-
fied in this model as reflective measurement mod-
els. All measures were validated in a discussion 
with compliance managers (DeVellis, 2012). For 
this purpose we organized a two-hour interview 
with a compliance manager of a large company, 
asking him each question of our survey. From his 
explanations we were able to redraw and adjust the 
questions in order to make them more practically 
sensible. All indicators were asked in such a way 
that the individual perceptions and evaluations 
of the employees were queried, for example, the 
perceived costs of compliance or noncompliance. 
With the exception of attitude and self-efficacy, 
indicators were measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree. Employees’ compliance inten-
tion was measured by asking the participant if he/
she intends to comply with the requirements of 
the compliance practice and the organization’s 
standards in the future and to carry out the pre-
scribed responsibility. The influences of attitude, 
normative beliefs, and self-efficacy on the compli-
ance intention were measured as follows.
Compliance Intention 
To measure the attitude toward compliance inten-
tion, a semantic differential was used as a global 
measure (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Here, the par-
ticipants were asked how necessary, important, or 
useful they deem compliance management to be 
(1 = very unimportant to 7 = extremely important). 
We asked concretely if the respondent intended 
to (a) comply with the requirements of the CP 
of his/her organization in the future, (b) comply 
with the organization standards according to the 
requirements of the CP of his/her organization in 
the future, (c) carry out the responsibilities pre-
scribed in the CP of the organization when he/she 
works for the organization in the future (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980). Consolidating these items to one 
factor reached a satisfactory alpha of 0.97.
Self-efficacy was measured based on the assess-
ment of individual skills, knowledge, and compe-
tence in relation to the observance of compliance 
management requirements on a 7-point Likert 
scale from 1 = almost never to 7 = almost always. 
Here, the respondent was asked if he/she has the 
necessary skills, knowledge, and competence to 
comply with the compliance program. We sub-
sumed these items to one factor that reached a 
satisfactory alpha of 0.91.
Normative beliefs were measured asking the 
participant if influential, important, or respected 
people think that he/she should comply with 
the compliance practice requirements. The par-
ticipant’s attitude is influenced by intrinsic and 
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by an expert scholar within the field of compli-
ance research. Concerning the indicator level, the 
reliability analysis shows the proportion of the 
variance of an indicator that is explained by its 
underlying construct (Hulland, 1999). All indica-
tors loaded significantly greater than 0.8 to their 
constructs, with the exception of the indicator per-
ceived detection of behavior, in which the loading 
was only 0.487. Since we deemed this indicator as 
essential for representing the theoretical breadth 
of its variable, we chose to retain it in the model, 
in line with expert advice (Hulland, 1999), since 
the loading exceeded 0.4.
For quality evaluation, the reliability of con-
struct or the convergence validity was used at the 
construct level (Hulland 1999). In the present 
case, all constructs demonstrated higher values 
than 0.6 (see Table III), indicating a robust con-
struct reliability. As an alternative or additional 
criterion of convergence reliability, Cronbach’s 
alpha (α) is often cited [construct reliability is ful-
filled in the case of values > 0.7 (Hulland, 1999; 
Nunnally, 1978)]. In the present measurement 
model, both the thresholds for construct reliabil-
ity and Cronbach’s alpha were at satisfactory lev-
els (the minimum value was 0.76).
Furthermore, the average variance extracted 
(AVE) of each construct was higher than the rec-
ommended value of 0.50 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; 
Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012). Finally, 
concerning discriminant validity, all squared cor-
relations per construct were consistently smaller 
than the AVE, and therefore we were satisfied 
with the discriminant validity of our measures 
(please see the detailed table of correlations and 
squared correlations of the individual constructs 
in the Appendices A–C). Finally, we performed a 
confirmatory factor analysis (data can be provided 
on request). All Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) values 
vs. male) was measured by a dichotomous vari-
able, while age was measured as a categorical 
variable asking participants their respective age 
range (under 20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, and above 
50). Both control variables can be assumed to 
be important following a study of compliance 
to speed limits, where TPB variables mediated 
the influence of gender and age on compliance 
behavior (Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003). 
Company size has also been measured with a 
categorical variable: small (less than 51 employ-
ees), medium-sized (51–250 employees), and 
large (above 250 employees). This variable may 
be important since bigger companies have stron-
ger external pressure to implement their compli-
ance programs (see Vroom & Von Solms, 2004, for 
an example of accounting compliance). Finally, 
the industry to which each participant belongs 
has been identified in detail, including 16 differ-
ent industry options. Responses were later newly 
coded as a dichotomous variable to show whether 
participants belong to either the service or the 
manufacturing segment, in order to increase the 
variable’s statistical power. For hierarchy, age, and 
size, we used a continuous PLS approach due to 
the continuous nature of the defined categories, 
while for the rest of the controlled variables, we 
used a dichotomous PLS approach.
Results
Quality Control of the Outer Model
To check reliability and validity at the construct 
and indicator level, the following quality criteria 
were used: content validity, indicator reliability, 
construct reliability, and discriminant validity 
(Hulland, 1999). We ensured content validity by 
our careful selection of indicators through a litera-
ture search, and our selection was later confirmed 
T A B L E  I I I  Overview of Convergence and Discriminant Validity
Construct Composite Reliability Cronbach’s α AVE Maximum squared correlation
Attitude 0.951 0.924 0.867 0.488
Cost of compliance 0.929 0.883 0.813 0.550
Cost of noncompliance 0.982 0.973 0.949 0.339
Behavior detection 0.802 0.759 0.591 0.070
Intention 0.979 0.968 0.940 0.463
Intrinsic cost 0.948 0.919 0.860 0.302
Normative beliefs 0.963 0.943 0.896 0.241
Sanction 0.925 0.880 0.805 0.339
Self-efﬁ cacy 0.941 0.907 0.842 0.488
Work impediment 0.975 0.961 0.928 0.550
Notes: AVE = average variance extracted.
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were significant and showed strong path coeffi-
cients greater than p = .2 with the exception of 
the path coefficient between normative beliefs to 
comply and compliance-intention. R² values from 
.308 to .572 or corrected R² values from .296 to 
.490 can be considered acceptable, since the model 
always explain only a few (two or maximum three) 
exogenous or endogenous variables (Henseler, 
Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). Looking at the effect 
size F² of Table IV, the exogenous variables “cost 
of noncompliance,” “sanctions,” intrinsic costs, 
and work impediment show a medium effect; 
the other variables of the significant paths, in 
contrast, have only small effects (Chin, 1998). In 
the overall view, the evaluation of the outer and 
inner model provides a high quality of the overall 
model. 
Test of Main Model
In partial support of Hypothesis 1, the results of the 
parameter estimates of the structural model show 
that the self-efficacy to comply (β = 0.231, p < .05) 
and the attitude toward compliance behavior (β = 
were higher than 0.6, and all Bartlett tests can be 
rejected (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2012). All of the 
measurement item loadings of the intended con-
structs were above 0.8 and were at least 0.1 less on 
their loadings on other constructs.
Quality Control of the Inner Model
In Table IV, all results of the parameter estimation 
of the internal model and the quality assessment 
are summarized. Our model showed hardly any 
change when control variables were added (con-
trol variables were age, gender, company size and 
service industry). As reported in Table IV, hierar-
chy is the only control variable that has a signifi-
cant negative influence on compliance intention 
(β = –0.181; p < .05). The rest of the variables are 
nonsignificant applying the .10 p-value threshold. 
The constructs measured in the external model are 
characterized by a high validity (convergent, dis-
criminant, and nomological). The vast majority 
of the presumed relationships of latent variables 
could be confirmed and have sufficiently high sig-
nificant path coefficients. Nearly all relationships 
T A B L E  I V  Detailed Information of Control, Moderator, and Explanatory Power
Exogenous Variable
Path 
 Coefﬁ cient t-value F ²
Endogenous 
 Variable
R ² 
( corrected)
Control Variables Compliance 
 intention
0.572 (0.490)
Age –0.004 0.116 0.041
Female 0.091 1.321 0.025
Company size –0.084 1.055 0.028
Service –0.083 1.451 0.027
Hierarchy –0.181 2.600 0.032
Moderator Variables
Hierachy*intrinsic costs 0.088 1.667 0.023
Hierarchy*sanctions 0.049 0.983 0.034
Hierarchy*detection of behavior –0.013 0.459 0.040
Hierarchy*work impediment 0.007 0.373 0.040
Explanatory Variables
Attitude 0.270 1.731 0.026
Normative beliefs 0.081 0.797 0.031
Self-efﬁ cacy to comply 0.231 2.585 0.022
Cost of compliance –0.090 1.075 0.012 Attitude 0.308 (0.296)
Cost of noncompliance 0.546 7.013 0.431
Work impediment 0.686 10.594 0.890 Cost of 
 compliance
0.471 (0.466)
Sanctions 0.376 5.208 0.197 Cost of 
 noncompliance
0.389 (0.373)
Detection of behavior 0.002 0.034 0.000
Intrinsic costs 0.319 3.673 0.122
Note: These are standardized path coefﬁ cients; sample size = 119; R² = explained variance.
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The present 
structural equation 
model assumes that 
the variable attitude 
fully mediates the 
relationship between 
general beliefs about 
the consequences 
of behavior and 
compliance intention.
relationship between general beliefs about the 
consequences of behavior and compliance inten-
tion. In line with Hypothesis 2, the results of the 
conducted z-tests by Sobel (1982) demonstrate a 
mediational role in the adjustment for the vari-
able perceived cost of noncompliance (see Table 
V). The value of path c, on the other hand, 
explains that the relationship between attitude to 
the perceived cost of noncompliance and compli-
ance intention is only partially mediated.
Test of Moderators
The moderating test with help of four interac-
tion terms is shown in Table IV and in line with 
Hypothesis 5, hierarchy has a positive moderat-
ing effect between intrinsic costs and compli-
ance intention. Hence, the relationship between 
intrinsic motivators and compliance intention 
is assumed to be slightly stronger for the upper 
management level group than for the lower man-
agement level group (β = 0.088, p < .1). The influ-
ence of extrinsic motivators makes no difference 
regarding the hierarchical levels. Hypothesis 6, 
therefore, is not supported. 
Discussion
In this study, we set out to contribute to the 
HRM literature by increasing our knowledge of 
0.270; p < .10) are positively related to compliance 
intention (see Figure 2). The normative beliefs (β = 
0.081) show no significant relation-
ship with the compliance intention.
In line with Hypothesis 3 the 
perceived cost of noncompliance (β 
= 0.546; p < .01) is positively related 
to attitude. Intrinsic costs (β = 0.319; 
p <.01) and extrinsic sanctions (β = 
0.401; p < .01) are perceived both 
as costs of noncompliance with 
a similar intensity. Only the per-
ceived behavioral detection (β = 
0.002) has a nonsignificant relation-
ship with the total perceived cost of 
noncompliance. 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported 
because a nonsignificant relation-
ship is observed between the per-
ceived cost of compliance and the 
attitude toward conforming to 
the compliance system. It should 
be noted that work impediment is significantly 
related to cost of compliance (β = 0.686, p < .01).
Test of Mediators
The present structural equation model assumes 
that the variable attitude fully mediates the 
No tes: These are standardized path coefﬁ cients; the control variables age, company size, gender, and industry have not been signiﬁ cant; the 
moderator hierarchy was tested between the four motivators and compliance intention; sample size = 119; signiﬁ cance levels: + < .1, * < .05, 
** < .01; R2 = explained variance; n.s. = not signiﬁ cant.
FIGURE 2. Overview of Results of Structural Equation Model of Compliance Behavior
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Employees apparently 
do understand 
the importance 
of complying with 
the compliance 
program and perceive 
resulting impediments 
in their work as 
ethically justified, 
which could explain 
the nonsignificant 
relationship with 
the attitude toward 
compliance intention.
our study the asked employees separate the cost of 
compliance from any calculus to comply, which 
distinguishes them from purely rational-acting 
individuals (Midgley, 1994). 
Specifically, a mere business-administrative 
consideration of compliance management that 
considers its implementation cost in terms of 
bureaucracy and inefficiency at work seems to be 
of little relevance for employees (see also Barsky, 
2007, for a related model of ethical 
costs). Rather, our findings indicate 
that the attitude of the staff depends 
on external incentives leading to 
costs of noncompliance and on 
the fear of the consequences of 
their own behavior. Indeed, intrin-
sic costs (e.g., the feeling of inner 
dissatisfaction in the case of non-
compliance) are strongly related to 
attitude toward compliance inten-
tion. We also do not find that supe-
riors’ observation of employees’ 
behavior (e.g., surveillance and con-
trol measures) is related to the cost 
of noncompliance. One explanation 
for this may be related to the fact 
that external control and monitor-
ing may not be seen as a clear and 
direct incentive for behavior since it 
requires giving up one’s own locus 
of control following SDT (Gagné & 
Deci, 2005).
Regarding the control variables, 
the results show that employees 
from higher hierarchies have less 
intention to comply than employees from lower 
hierarchies. This result is astonishing and may 
explain that most crimes happen at higher hier-
archies. Reasons for this may be that top man-
agers have more freedom to act and also possess 
the power to execute their own rules, which may 
distance them from following these rules. These 
the sources of employees’ motivation for holding 
higher levels of compliance behavior intention. 
In addition, we contribute to the motivation lit-
erature (i.e., SDT) by showing how these sources 
differ, comparing low and high organizational 
hierarchies.  
Implications for Compliance Research
Our results contribute to our knowledge in com-
pliance research in two ways: First, we observe that 
the compliance intention seems to be influenced 
by the employee’s skills and the knowledge that 
they have to be able to comply with the various 
provisions of the compliance management sys-
tem. Second, a generally positive attitude toward 
conforming to compliance management require-
ments, which is shaped by extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivators, seems essential for achieving high lev-
els of compliance intention. 
Our research extends and challenges TPB and 
SDT by integrating both theoretical approaches. 
First, our findings suggest that employees’ com-
pliance intention does not depend on what they 
think that their colleagues believe about the 
compliance program. Following SDT, this can be 
explained due to the extrinsic nature of such nor-
mative beliefs. Following the compliance program 
is possibly an innate feeling of attitude and self-
efficacy that may not be significantly related to 
the opinion of others.
Second, the strong validity of our rational 
choice model generally supports the more ratio-
nal approach to compliance in the corporate 
crime context (Becker, 1968). However, the non-
significant effect of cost of compliance on atti-
tude reveals a new perspective on rational choice 
theory. Employees apparently do understand the 
importance of complying with the compliance 
program and perceive resulting impediments 
in their work as ethically justified, which could 
explain the nonsignificant relationship with the 
attitude toward compliance intention. Indeed, in 
T A B L E  V  Mediator Analysis of Attitude and Compliance Intention
IV Path a¹ Path b¹ Path c¹ Path d SE a SE b z-Value p-Value
Cost of compliance –0.090 0.270* –0.025 –0.057 0.084 0.156 –0.576 0.568
Cost of noncompliance 0.546*** 0.270* 0.126** 0.287** 0.078 0.156 1.643 0.100
Notes:
IV = independent variable
¹ Here we used standardized path coefﬁ cients (see Sobel, 1982, p. 301).
Path a: Path coefﬁ cient relationship of IV → Attitude (mediator variable)
Path b: Path coefﬁ cient relationship of Attitude → Intention
Path c: Path coefﬁ cient relationship of IV → Intention (direct effect)
Path d: Path coefﬁ cient relationship of IV → Intention (without mediator variable; i.e., entire effect = a ∙ b + c)
Signiﬁ cance levels: + < .1, * < .05, ** <.01
SE: standard error
z: Evaluation of signiﬁ cance of indirect effects via 
z = a ∙ b
   √b2 ∙ SFa2 + a2 ∙ SFb2
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Self-determination 
is apparently 
influenced by the 
contextual settings 
that come with higher 
hierarchies, which 
are status within 
the organization, 
the relatedness to 
the organization’s 
objectives, and the 
competence within 
the organization.
the subordinated levels of management. This may 
also be due to the function of top management as 
role models for compliance management and the 
fact that higher hierarchies may also fear (infor-
mal) losses and other types of consequences from 
extrinsic punishments. 
Practical Implications for HR Managers
Our results show that both extrinsic and intrin-
sic motivators may predict the individual cost of 
employees with regard to corporate compliance 
behavior. However, pursuing both strategies at 
the same time may be difficult for an organiza-
tion since intrinsic motivators require the absence 
of extrinsic motivators. For companies, shaping 
areas free of extrinsic motivators may be essential 
since they provide the opportunity for employees 
to internalize external regulations (Deci & Ryan, 
1985). This way, extrinsically motivated compli-
ance regulations may become perceived as being 
satisfying, inherent, or interesting to pursue, 
which are classic intrinsic motivation character-
istics. Although this internalization of external 
regulations poses the biggest challenges for com-
panies today, it may have the biggest potential to 
increase compliance behavior. 
Comparing our hierarchical moderating 
results with our control variable results, there is 
something of a double standard, where on the 
one hand top managers are held to be intrinsi-
cally motivated but on the other are in general less 
compliant and, hence, often the cause of compli-
ance scandals. Following SDT, we argue that the 
relatively high intrinsic motivation of top manag-
ers (as our results show) may be lowered by extrin-
sic incentive systems. This means if the goal is to 
maximize intrinsic motivation at the top man-
agement level, high bonus payments may be par-
ticularly harmful (Rost & Weibel, 2013). Imposing 
external incentives such as payments, laws, or 
regulations threatens a crowding out of intrin-
sic motivation (Tyler & Blader, 2005). However, 
if a company is aware of its set of extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivators, pursuing a combined strat-
egy is not only possible but also more efficient. 
Nowadays, companies are not considering intrin-
sic motivators as part of their compliance man-
agement system (Frey et al., 2013). Compliance 
management, however, needs to be perceived as 
a holistic concept of internalization of external 
company values. Aligning the values and needs 
of the company with their employees’ has to be 
a top priority. For instance, by way of providing 
a greater degree of involvement and a greater 
voice, employees can be convinced that compli-
ance behavior is built on their own responsibility 
instead of control and external regulations (Gagné 
results may explain why the most and worst 
economic crimes happen at higher levels (PWC, 
2010).
Implications for Motivation Research
Our results enhance our understanding in moti-
vation research by analyzing how extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivators may influence compliance 
intention on low and high organizational lev-
els. Although higher hierarchies have a negative 
effect on the compliance intention, it turns out 
that intrinsic costs are more positive related to 
the compliance intention in the upper manage-
ment level than in the lower level. This may be 
due to the reason that people in upper manage-
ment are more likely to follow intrinsic values 
since they are used to act as a role model for com-
pliance management (Dries & Pepermans, 2012). 
People in the upper level may have 
to worry more about informal losses 
from noncompliance behavior than 
do employees at lower levels (e.g., 
loss of power, prestige, credibility 
and status), which could ultimately 
be manifested in a stronger sense of 
anticipated dissatisfaction (Cohen & 
Simpson, 1997). Additionally, being 
involved in the central decisions 
may lead to an increased internaliza-
tion of external regulations, which 
is due to the close relation of the 
top manager’s and the company’s 
goals compared to the employees 
of the lower hierarchies of the orga-
nization. In order to close this gap, 
companies may either flatten the 
hierarchies or align the employee’s 
goals with the goals of the organiza-
tion. Thus, scholars should further 
investigate these structural factors 
as they form an important factor of 
self-determination within organiza-
tions. Self-determination is appar-
ently influenced by the contextual settings that 
come with higher hierarchies, which are status 
within the organization, the relatedness to the 
organization’s objectives, and the competence 
within the organization.
In contrast, the influence of extrinsic motiva-
tors on compliance intention are not moderated 
by the hierarchical level. For employees in the 
lower level, it seems that fears of punishment or 
negative assessments are equally salient influences 
on the perceived cost of noncompliance than for 
their supervisors. Thus, it can be argued that in 
the upper management level, extrinsic motiva-
tors tend to play a similar role than they do in 
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If positive feedback 
for the employees 
in the form of praise 
comes unexpectedly 
and is perceived as 
informing (and not 
as controlling) a 
feel of competence, 
ultimately the feeling 
of intrinsic motivation 
can be initiated.
& Deci, 2005). Incentives in the form of pay raises, 
promotions, praise, or recognition can have a pow-
erful effect on compliance management, but these 
extrinsic effects may not lead to internalization of 
the companies’ regulation as values. Especially in 
the sales area, rewards or sanctions for reaching or 
not reaching certain sales targets are widely used 
and familiar incentives for employees (Treviño 
& Nelson, 2011), but there is very little use of 
individual recognition techniques beyond the 
“employee of the month.”
The incentive system that includes the 
achievement of sales targets or even compliance 
goals (e.g., avoidance of certain illegal sales tech-
niques) should, therefore, leave room for intrin-
sic achievements, such as a simple recognition 
by a colleague for an outstanding behavior. In 
the case of pay, individuals often hold normative 
beliefs that perceive money as a less noble cause of 
motivation than factors such as challenging tasks 
(Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). But, if positive 
feedback for the employees in the form of praise 
comes unexpectedly and is perceived as inform-
ing (and not as controlling) a feel of competence, 
ultimately the feeling of intrinsic motivation 
can be initiated (Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 1999). 
Concerning normative beliefs, companies may 
identify groups with a strong cohesion and affect 
the group leader, so that the group members are 
positively influenced in relation to compliance 
behavior (Treviño & Nelson, 2011). Training on 
the company’s internal compliance management 
requirements may contribute to an increased self-
efficacy of the employee, that is, the knowledge 
and skills that are needed for them to comply with 
the requirements of the compliance management 
system. 
Finally, valuable resources for controls and 
incentives can be provided by companies if the 
employees work as a result of their own sense of 
responsibility, that is, if they conform on their 
own to compliance management requirements 
(Tyler & Blader, 2005). In particular, it is useful 
to have employees from different departments 
involved in the design and development of the 
compliance management system (Treviño et al., 
1999; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). This participa-
tive management increases intrinsic motivation 
due to an increase in the feeling of self-determi-
nation and competence (Deci, Ryan, & Guay, 
2013; Lynch, Vansteenkiste, Deci, & Ryan, 2010). 
According to Paine (1994), such a value-based 
integrity strategy can contribute to responsible 
and exemplary ethical behavior, rather than seek-
ing the minimum goal of preventing breaches of 
the law. Additionally, it is necessary to enforce the 
requirements of compliance management in a fair 
and equitable manner (Treviño & Nelson, 2011). 
Sanctions in the enterprise context are especially 
effective if the employees consider them fair (Ball, 
Treviño, & Sims, 1994). This means that the sanc-
tions conform to the particular rule infringement 
and are applied equally to all employees (Treviño 
& Nelson, 2011). Moreover, sanctions should 
be constructively and clearly explained to the 
employees. Anchoring detailed and complicated-
sounding laws of conduct in the compliance man-
agement system should be avoided. Instead, the 
ethical values of the company should be clearly 
communicated and strongly supported by the top 
management. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Since cross-sectional data for the empirical veri-
fication of the model is used in the 
present study, it is recommended 
that future studies resolve the cor-
relation versus causality problem 
by doing research at different time 
points (Rossmann, 2011). If com-
pliance intention and the affecting 
variables are measured at different 
time points, it would make sense to 
also capture the actual compliance 
behavior. The more the measure-
ment is based on actual observed 
behavior of employees, as opposed 
to self-reported behavior, the state-
ment of behavior will be more sub-
stantial. Other methods may be 
appropriate for such an endeavor 
(e.g., focusing on particular com-
panies and the use of case stud-
ies and scenarios). Our findings 
might have implications not only 
for further in-role expectations, 
but also for the broader execution of the work 
role. Accordingly, future research could study 
outcomes beyond in-role expectations, such as 
corporate citizenship behavior and counterpro-
ductive work behaviors.
In terms of cost assessments of individuals 
with regard to compliance management, the pos-
sible benefit of noncompliance is not included in 
this study. However, individuals may see a ben-
efit in a failure to accomplish the requirements 
of a compliance management system, such as a 
“thrill” or obtaining a commercial advantage [e.g., 
when selling techniques that are prohibited by 
the compliance management system are applied 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996)]. We did include 
this perspective indirectly assuming that it might 
decrease the costs of noncompliance. Since our 
rational choice approach does explicitly not cover 
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motivation in the context of compliance and 
to identify empirically any further determi-
nants (e.g., corporate cultural aspects). Finally, 
the work on perceived consequences of action 
focuses only on the individuals themselves. It 
is also conceivable that the recruitment of indi-
viduals depends on the costs and benefits that 
affect the company. Examples of this can be 
the risks for companies (reputation and finan-
cial loss). Such consequences, which affect the 
company and not the individuals, will also be 
a useful addition to the model. As a final limi-
tation, our PLS-based measurement approach 
provides prediction orientation rather than aim-
ing at testing model relationships in an explana-
tory sense (i.e., theory testing), which can only 
be done by covariance-based structural equation 
modeling (Rigdon, 2012). Our design attempted 
a smaller but specialized sample to identify the 
new compliance phenomenon rather than big 
data, which is needed for covariance-based test-
ing. Hence, we recommend development of 
a variance-based approach in order to test the 
mentioned hypotheses of this article.
Conclusion
Compliance management is used to address legal 
risks and ethical challenges to avoid financial 
and reputational damage from illegal actions. 
Compliance management systems are not always 
followed by the company’s employees. The pres-
ent study has examined motivational factors for 
compliance behavior in terms of compliance with 
the company’s internal compliance management 
system. We show that the intention to conform to 
the requirements of the internal corporate com-
pliance management system is largely explained 
by the individual’s attitude toward compliance 
behavior. The employees develop their attitude as 
part of a rational cost calculation, which in turn 
is based on beliefs about the consequences of 
courses of action. These anticipated consequences 
are influenced by extrinsic motivators across all 
hierarchical levels of an organization, while the 
top management is particularly influenced by 
intrinsic motivators.
the concept of “thrill,” the tested model offers 
potential for expansion.
The identification and exploration of the “two 
faces” of top management might be an interest-
ing object of investigation for future research. 
Empirical research shows that firms targeted by 
class action lawsuits over securities (e.g. Niehaus 
& Roth, 1999) and by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission because of fraudulent financial 
statements (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Karpoff, 1999) are 
also those yielding higher rates of CEO turn-
over. Similarly, while there is proof that corrup-
tion is related to national cultural differences (see 
Werner, 2000) and a country’s level of economic 
development (see Ehrlich & Lui, 1999), few stud-
ies have explicitly linked corruption with career 
success (e.g., Hamori, 2007; Harris & Ogbonna, 
2006). The identification and exploration of these 
“two faces” of top management might be an inter-
esting object of investigation for future research.
A model based on a widely conceived ratio-
nal choice approach, which links the two aspects 
of motivation with each other (i.e., extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors) can provide a deeper understand-
ing of individual compliance behavior in the cor-
porate context. A sound theoretical basis with 
which intrinsic motivation can be added to classi-
cal extrinsic incentives and integrated into an eco-
nomic model of behavior is crucial. Furthermore, 
the perceived behavior detection has not proven 
to be a significant influencing factor for perceived 
costs of noncompliance. This variable should be 
checked, if necessary, in an alternative model. In 
addition, the operationalization of intrinsic moti-
vators in relation to compliance behavior should 
be further developed. Finally, a cross-sectional 
study may focus on the crowding-out effect and 
the control paradox in order to make statements 
about how compliance change depends on the 
types of motivation intervention and how moti-
vators interact.
Concepts that are related to intrinsic moti-
vators such as legitimacy and procedural jus-
tice may be included in an alternative model. 
Therefore, future research efforts may build on 
these two possible determinants of intrinsic 
MARCEL HOFEDITZ is a postdoc at the Department of Organization, Human Resource Man-
agement and Innovation at the University of Münster. His work has been published and 
accepted for publication in journals such as Human Resource Management, Personnel 
Review, and International Journal of Bank Marketing. His PhD focused on trust and compli-
ance as building blocks of efﬁ cient human resource management.
ANN-MARIE NIENABER is a reader in Business Management at the Centre for Trust, Peace 
and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University. She received her PhD from the Uni-
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
 EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC COMPLIANCE MOTIVATORS 43
References
Adam, A. M., & Rachman-Moore, D. (2004). The methods used 
to implement an ethical code of conduct and employee 
attitudes. Journal of Business Ethics, 54(3), 223–242.
Adler, P. P., & Borys, B. (1996).Two types of bureaucracy: 
Enabling and coercive. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
41(1), 61–89. 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F., & Karpoff, J. M. (1999). Manage-
ment turnover and governance changes following the 
revelation of fraud. Journal of Law and Economics, 42(1), 
309–342.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 
179–211.
Ajzen, I. (2005). Attitudes, personality, and behavior (2nd 
ed.). Maidenhead, England: Open University Press. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and 
predicting social behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efﬁ cacy of the theory of 
planned behaviour: A meta-analytic review. British Jour-
nal of Social Psychology, 40(4), 471–499. 
Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating non-
response bias in mail surveys. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 14(3), 396–402. 
Bagozzi, R. P., & Yi, Y. (1988). On the evaluation of structural 
equation models. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 16(1), 74–94. 
Ball, G. A., Treviño, L. K., & Sims, H. P. Jr. (1994). Just and 
unjust punishment: Inﬂ uences on subordinate perfor-
mance and citizenship. Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 37(2), 299–322. 
Bamberger, P. (2008). From the editors beyond contextualiza-
tion: Using context theories to narrow the micro-macro 
gap in management research. Academy of Management 
Journal, 51(5), 839–846.
Barsky, A. (2007). Understanding the ethical cost of organi-
zational goal-setting: A review and theory development. 
Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 
1–6. doi:10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26533588
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic 
approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169.
Begley, T. M., Lee, C., & Hui, C. (2006). Organizational level as 
a moderator of the relationship between justice percep-
tions and work-related reactions. Journal of Organiza-
tional Behavior, 27(6), 705–772.
Boss, S. R., & Kirsch, L. J. (2007, December 9–12). The last 
line of defense: Motivating employees to follow corpo-
rate security guidelines. Proceedings of the 28th Inter-
national Conference on Information Systems, Montreal, 
Paper 103.
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012). Economic incen-
tives and social preferences: Substitutes or comple-
ments? Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2), 368–425. 
doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368
Braithwaite, J., & Makkai, T. (1991). Testing an expected utility 
model of corporate deterrence. Law and Society Review, 
25(1), 7–40.
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Informa-
tion security policy compliance: An empirical study of 
rationality-based beliefs and information security aware-
ness. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 523–548.
Carroll, A. B. (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model 
of corporate performance. Academy of Management 
Review, 4(4), 497–505.
Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social respon-
sibility: Toward the moral management of organizational 
stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(4), 39–48. 
Cerasoli, C. P., Nicklin, J. M., & Ford, M. T. (2014). Intrinsic 
motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict perfor-
mance: A 40-year meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin. 
Advance online publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0035661
versity of Münster. Her work has been accepted for publication in journals such as Human 
Resource Management, Personnel Review, and International Journal of Innovation Manage-
ment. Her research interests focus on trust in and between organizations (in particular trust 
in teams and in the supply chain) and sustainable (social as well as environmental) and ethi-
cal management.
ANDERS DYSVIK is professor of Organizational Behavior at the Department of Leadership 
and Organizational Behavior, BI Norwegian Business School. He received his PhD from BI 
Norwegian Business School. His work has been accepted for publication in journals such as 
Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management Studies, and Human Resource 
Management. He is the Norwegian representative to the Collaboration for Cross-Cultural 
Research on Contemporary Careers (5C). He is a member of the Editorial Board for the Acad-
emy of Management Learning and Education and Human Resource Management Journal.
GERHARD SCHEWE is owner of the Chair of Organization, Human Resource Management 
and Innovation at the University of Münster. He received his PhD from the University of Kiel. 
His work has been accepted for publication in journals such as Human Resource Manage-
ment and International Journal of Innovation Management. He is editor of the German Jour-
nal of Leadership and Organization. 
44 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2017
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
Chin, W. W. (1998). The partial least squares approach to 
structural equation modeling. In G. A. Marcoulides 
(Ed.), Modern business research methods (pp. 295–336). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Chow, I. H., Huang, J.-C., & Liu, S. (2008). Strategic HRM 
in China: Conﬁ gurations and competitive advantage. 
Human Resource Management, 47(4), 687–706. 
Cohen, M. A., & Simpson, S. S. (1997). The origins of corpo-
rate criminality: Rational individual and organizational 
actors. In W. S. Lofquist, M. A. Cohen, & G. A. Rabe (Eds.), 
Debating corporate crime (pp. 33–51). Highland Heights, 
KY: Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Northern Ken-
tucky University.
deCharms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective 
determinants of behavior. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1980). The empirical exploration of 
intrinsic motivational processes. Advances in Experimen-
tal Social Psychology, 13(2), 39–80.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and 
self-determination in human behavior. New York, NY: 
Plenum Press.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of 
goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination 
of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227–268.
Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M., & Guay, F. (2013). Self-determination 
theory and actualization of human potential. In D. M. 
McInerney, H. W. Marsh, R. G. Craven, & F. Guay (Éds.), 
Theory driving research: New wave perspectives on self-
processes and human development (pp. 109–133). Scotts-
dale, AZ: Information Age.
Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M. & Koestner, R. (1999). A meta-analytic 
review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic 
rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 
125(6), 627–668. 
DeVellis, R. F. (2012). Scale development: Theory and applica-
tions (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Dries, N., & Pepermans, R. (2012). How to identify leader-
ship potential: Development and testing of a consensus 
model. Human Resource Management, 51(3), 361–385. 
doi:10.1002/hrm.21473
Ehrlich, I. (1972). The deterrent effect of criminal law enforce-
ment. Journal of Legal Studies, 1(2), 259–276. 
Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. T. (1999). Bureaucratic corruption and 
endogenous economic growth. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 107(6), 270–293.
Elliott, M. A., Armitage, C. J., & Baughan, C. J. (2003). Driv-
ers’ compliance with speed limits: An application of the 
theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, 88(5), 964–972.
European Commission. (2009). Commission staff working 
document on the implementation of commission recom-
mendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the deﬁ nition of 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Brussels, 
Belgium: Author. 
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006). The hidden costs of control. 
American Economic Review, 96(5), 1611–1630. 
Farndale, E., Paauwe, J., & Boselie, P. (2010). An exploratory 
study of governance in the intra-ﬁ rm human resources 
supply chain. Human Resource Management, 49(5), 
849–868.
Feldman, Y. (2011, Winter). The complexity of disentangling 
intrinsic and extrinsic compliance motivations: Theoreti-
cal and empirical insights from the behavioral analysis of 
law. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 35, 
11–51. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and 
behavior: An introduction to theory and research, Read-
ing, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2006). The symbolic manage-
ment of strategic change: Sensegiving via framing and 
decoupling. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 
1173–1193.
Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money: An economic 
theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham, England: 
Brookﬁ eld.
Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M. (2013). Organiza-
tional control systems and pay-for-performance in the 
public service. Organization Studies, 34, 949–972.
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(5), 589–611. 
Funken, C. (2004). Geld statt Macht? Weibliche und männli-
che Karrieren im Vertrieb: eine organisationssoziologis-
che studie [Money instead of power? Female and male 
careers in sales: An organization sociological study]. 
campus, Frankfurt and New York.
Gagné, M., & Deci, E.L. (2005). Self-determination theory 
and work motivation. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 
26(4), 331–362. doi:10.1002/job.322.
Gagné, M., & Forest, J. (2008). The study of compensation 
through the lens of self-determination theory: Recon-
ciling 35 years of debate. Canadian Psychology, 49(3), 
225–232. doi:10.1037/a0012757
Gardner, H. K. (2012). Performance pressure as a double-
edged sword: Enhancing team motivation but undermin-
ing the use of team knowledge. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 57, 1–46.
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique 
of the transaction cost theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(1), 13–47.
Gong, Y., & Janssen M. (2012). From policy implementation 
to business process management: Principles for creating 
exibility and agility. Government Information Quarterly, 
29(1), 61–71.
Grant, A. M., & Nurmohamed, S. Ashford, S. J., & Dekas, K. 
(2011). The performance implications of ambivalent initia-
tive: The interplay of autonomous and controlled moti-
vations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 116, 241–251.
Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. Jr. (1990). Conscience, sig-
niﬁ cant others, and rational choice: Extending the deter-
rence model. Law and Society Review, 24(3), 837–862.
Hair, J. F., & Sarstedt, M., & Ringle, C. M., & Mena, J. A. 
(2012). An assessment of the use of partial least squares 
structural equation modeling in marketing research. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 40(3), 
414–433. 
Hamori, M. (2007). Career success after stigmatizing organi-
zational events. Human Resource Management, 46(4), 
493–511.
Harbaugh, W. T. (1998). The prestige motive for making charita-
ble transfers. American Economic Review, 88(2), 277–282. 
Harland, C., Brenchley, R., & Walker, H. (2003). Risk in supply 
networks. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Manage-
ment, 9(2), 51–62.
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
 EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC COMPLIANCE MOTIVATORS 45
Harris, L. C., & Ogbonna, E. (2006). Approaches to career 
success: An exploration of surreptitious career-success 
strategies. Human Resource Management, 45(1), 43–65.
Henseler, J., Ringle, C., & Sinkovics, R. (2009). The use of 
partial least squares path modeling in international mar-
keting. Advances in International Marketing, 20, 277–319. 
Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009). Protection motivation and 
deterrence: A framework for security policy compliance 
in organizations. European Journal of Information Sys-
tems, 18(2), 106–125.
Hu, Q., Dinev, T., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2012). Managing 
employee compliance with information security policies: 
The critical role of top management and organizational 
culture. Decision Sciences, 43(4), 615–659.
Hulland, J. (1999). Use of partial least squares (PLS) in stra-
tegic management research: A review of four recent stud-
ies. Strategic Management Journal, 20(2), 195–204. 
Jarvis, C. B., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, P. M. (2003). A 
critical review of construct indicators and measurement 
model misspeciﬁ cation in marketing and consumer 
research. Journal of Consumer Research, 30(2), 199–218. 
Johns, G. (2006). The essential impact of context on organi-
zational behavior. Academy of Management Review, 
31(2), 386–408. 
Kish-Gephart, J. J., Harrison, D. A., & Treviño, L. (2010). Bad 
apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: Meta-analytic evi-
dence about sources of unethical decisions at work. Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, 95(1), 1–31.
Lindenberg, S. (2001). Intrinsic motivation in a new light. 
Kyklos, 54, 317–342.
Lindenberg, S., & Foss, N. J. (2011). Managing joint produc-
tion motivation: The role of goal framing and governance 
mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 36(3), 
500–525. doi:10.5465/AMR.2011.61031808
Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. 
(2010). Autonomy as process and outcome: Revisiting 
cultural and practical issues in motivation for counseling. 
The Counseling Psychologist, 39(2,) 286–302.
Lu, R., Sadiq, S., & Governatori, G. (2008). Measurement of 
compliance distance in business processes. Information 
Systems Management, 25(4), 344–355.
MacLean, T. L., & Behnam, M. (2010). The dangers of decou-
pling: The relationship between compliance manage-
ments, legitimacy perceptions, and institutionalized 
misconduct. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 
1499–1520. 
Maignan, I., Ferrell, O. C., & Hult, G. T. M. (1999). Corporate citi-
zenship: Cultural antecedents and business beneﬁ ts. Jour-
nal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27(4), 455–469. 
Makkai, T., & Braithwaite, J. (1994). The dialectics of corpo-
rate deterrence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delin-
quency, 31(4), 347–373. 
Marcoulides, G. A., Chin, W. W., & Saunders, C. (2009). A 
critical look at partial least squares modeling. MIS Quar-
terly: Management Information Systems, 33(1), 171–176.
McCabe, D. L., Treviño, L. K., & Butterﬁ eld, K. D. (1996). The 
inﬂ uence of collegiate and corporate codes of conduct on 
ethics-related behavior in the workplace. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 6(4), 461–476. 
McIntosh, C. N., Edwards, J. R., & Antonakis, J. (2014). 
Reﬂ ections on partial least squares path modeling. 
Organizational Research Methods, 17(2), 210–251.
McKendall, M., DeMarr, B., & Jones-Rikkers, C. (2002). Ethi-
cal compliance managements and corporate illegality: 
Testing the assumptions of the corporate sentencing 
guidelines. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(4), 367–383.
Michaelson, C. (2006). Compliance and the illusion of ethical 
progress. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(2), 241–251. 
Midgley, M. (1994). The ethical primate: Humans, freedom 
and morality. London, England: Routledge. 
Myers, T. A. (2011). Goodbye, listwise deletion: Presenting 
hot deck imputation as an easy and effective tool for han-
dling missing data. Communication Methods and Meas-
ures, 5(4), 297–310.
Newman, D. A. (2014). Missing data: Five practical guide-
lines. Organizational Research Methods, 17(4), 372–411.
Niehaus, G., & Roth, G. (1999). Insider trading, equity issues, 
and CEO turnover in ﬁ rms subject to securities class 
action. Financial Management, 28(4), 52–72.
Norman, W. (2011). Business ethics as self-regulation: Why 
principles that ground regulations should be used to 
ground beyond-compliance norms as well. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 102(1), 43–57.
Nunnally, J. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed.). New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill.
Organ, D. W., Podsakoff, P. M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (2006). 
Organizational citizenship behavior: Its nature, anteced-
ents, and consequences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007). Employees’ 
behavior towards IS security policy compliance. Proceed-
ings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on Sys-
tem Sciences, Los Alamitos, CA, pp. 156–166. 
Paine, L. (1994). Managing for organizational integrity. Har-
vard Business Review, 72(2), 106–17. 
Parker, C., & Nielsen, V. L. (2011a). Introduction. In C. Parker 
& V. L. Nielsen (Eds.), Explaining compliance: Business 
responses to regulation (pp. 1–33). Cheltenham, England: 
Edward Elgar. 
Parker, C., & Nielsen, V. L. (2011b). Deterrence and the impact 
of calculative thinking on business compliance with regu-
lation. The Antitrust Bulletin, 56(2), 377–426. 
Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A rational choice 
theory of corporate crime. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson 
(Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice: Advances 
in  criminological theory (pp. 37–58). Transactions 
 Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.): 
New Jersey. 
Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction threats and 
appeals to morality: Testing a rational choice model of 
corporate crime. Law and Society Review, 30(3), 549–583. 
Peterson, S. J., & Luthans, F. (2006). The impact of ﬁ nancial 
and nonﬁ nancial incentives on business-unit outcomes 
over time. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(1), 156–165.
Pinto J., Leana, C., & Pil F. (2008). Corrupt organizations 
or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two types of 
organization-level corruption. Academy of Management 
Review, 33(3), 685–709.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, 
N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral 
research: A critical review of the literature and recom-
mended  remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 
879–903.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2012). 
Sources of method bias in social science research and 
46 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2017
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
recommendations on how to control it. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 63, 539–569.
Podsakoff, N. P., Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Maynes, 
T. D., & Spoelma, T. M. (2014). Consequences of unit-level 
organizational citizenship behaviors: A review and rec-
ommendations for future research. Journal of Organiza-
tional Behavior, 35(1), 87–119.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). (2010). Compliance 
und Unternehmenskultur: Zur aktuellen Situation in 
deutschen Großunternehmen [Compliance and corporate 
culture: The current situation in large German compa-
nies]. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from http://www.pwc.de/
de/risiko-management/assets/studie_Compliance-und-
Unternehmenskultur.pdf
Rigdon, E. E. (2012). Rethinking partial least squares path 
modeling: In praise of simple methods. Long Range Plan-
ning, 45(5), 341–358.
Rönkkö, M., & Evermann, J. (2013). A critical examination 
of common beliefs about partial least squares path 
 modeling. Organizational Research Methods, 16(3), 
425–448.
Rossmann, C. (2011). Theory of reasoned action, theory of 
planned behavior. Baden-Baden, Germany: International 
Specialized Book Service Incorporated, 2010.
Rost, K., & Weibel, A. (2013). CEO pay from a social norm 
perspective: The infringement and reestablishment of 
fairness norms. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 21(4), 351–372. doi:10.1111/corg.12018
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2002). An overview of self-deter-
mination theory. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Hand-
book of self-determination research (pp. 3–33). Rochester, 
NY: University of Rochester Press.
Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Minette, K. A. (2004). The impor-
tance of pay in employee motivation: Discrepancies 
between what people say and what they do. Human 
Resource Management, 43(4), 381–394.
Schafer, J. L., & Graham, J. W. (2002). Missing data: Our 
view of the state of the art. Psychological Methods, 7(2), 
147–177.
Schminke, M., Cropanzano, R. S., & Rupp, D. E. (2002). 
Organization structure and fairness perceptions: The 
moderating effects of organizational level. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 881–905.
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic conﬁ dence intervals for indi-
rect effects in structural equation models. In S. Leinhardt 
(Ed.), Sociological methodology (pp. 290–312). San Fran-
cisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Stansburry, J., & Barry, B. (2007). Ethics managements and 
the paradox of control. Business Ethics Quarterly, 17(2), 
239–261. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of 
intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. D. Austin (Eds.), 
Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago, 
IL: Nelson Hall.
Treviño, L. K., & Nelson, K. A. (2011). Managing business 
ethics: Straight talk about how to do it right (5th ed.). 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Treviño, L. K., Gibson, D. G., Weaver, G. R., & Tofﬂ er, B. L. 
(1999). Managing ethics and legal compliance: What 
works and what hurts. California Management Review, 
41(2), 131–151. 
Trullen, J., & Stevenson, W. B. (2006). Strategy and legiti-
macy. Business & Society, 45(2), 178–210.
Tyler, T. R. (1999). Why people cooperate with organizations: 
An identity-based perspective. In B. M. Staw & R. Sutton 
(Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (pp. 201–246). 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2005). Can businesses effectively 
regulate employee conduct? The Antecedents of rule fol-
lowing in work settings. Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 48(6), 1143–1158.
Van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. 
(1997). How do I judge my outcome when I do not know 
the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair pro-
cess effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
72, 1034–1046.
Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A. M., & Lind, E. A. (1998). When 
do we need fairness? The role of trust in procedural 
authority. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
75, 1449–1458.
Van Dyne, L., Cummings, L. L., & Parks, J. M. (1995). Extra-
role behaviors: In pursuit of construct and deﬁ nitional 
clarity (a bridge over muddied waters). Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 75(17), 215–285.
Vroom, C., & Von Solms, R. (2004). Towards information 
security behavioural compliance. Computers & Security, 
23(3), 191–198.
Weaver, G. R., & Treviño, L. K. (1999). Compliance and values 
oriented ethics managements: Inﬂ uences on employees’ 
attitudes and behavior. Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(2), 
315–335. 
Weaver, G. R., & Treviño, L. K. (2001). Outcomes of organi-
zational ethics managements: Inﬂ uences of perceived 
values, compliance, and distrust orientations. Academy 
of Management Proceedings, No. 1, B1–B6. 
Weibel, A., Rost, K., & Osterloh, M. (2010). Pay for perfor-
mance in the public sector: Beneﬁ ts and (hidden) costs. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
20(2), 387–412.
Welsh, D. T., & Ordóñez, L. D. (2014). The dark side of con-
secutive high performance goals: Linking goal setting, 
depletion, and unethical behavior. Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 79–89.
Werner, C. (2000). Gifts, bribes, and development in post-
Soviet Kazakstan. Human Organization, 59(1), 11–22.
White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of 
competence. Psychological Review, 66, 297–333.
Williams, L. J., Edwards, J. R., & Vandenberg, R. J. 2003. 
Recent advances in causal modeling methods for organi-
zational and management research. Journal of Manage-
ment, 29(6), 903–936.
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and 
antitrust implications. A study in the economics of inter-
nal organization. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
 EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC COMPLIANCE MOTIVATORS 47
 A P P E N D I X  A  Overview of Questionnaire: Scales and Data
Dimensions & Questions Scale Average STD Loading t-Value
Intention to comply with the Compliance Program (CP)          
C1: I intend to comply with the requirements of the CP of my 
organization in the future.
a 6.395 1.166 0.947 26,609
C2: I intend to comply to the organization standards according 
to the requirements of the CP of my organization in the future.
a 6.336 1.329 0.983 90,686
C3: I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the 
CP of my organization when I work for the organization in the 
future.
a 6.345 1.330 0.978 68,500
Normative Beliefs
_____ think that I should comply with the requirements of the 
CP. 
NB1: People who are inﬂ uential to me a 5.496 1.987 0.933 34,772
NB2: People who are important to me a 5.352 1.899 0.951 52,264
NB3: People whom I respect a 5.543 1.854 0.955 71,935
Self-Efﬁ cacy to Comply 
I have the necessary _____ to fulﬁ ll the requirements of the CP. 
SE1: skills b 6.223 1.166 0.928 25,346
SE2: knowledge b 5.917 1.345 0.933 49,689
SE3: competencies b 5.880 1.412 0.891 24,788
Attitude
To me, complying with the requirements of the CP is _______. 
A1: unnecessary … necessary c 6.144 1.237 0.944 68,152
A2: unbeneﬁ cial … beneﬁ cial c 6.047 1.359 0.947 60,274
A3: unimportant … important c 5.654 1.430 0.902 38,230
Perceived Cost of Compliance
Complying with the requirements of the CP is _____ for me.
CC1: time consuming a 3.588 2.089 0.940 72,467
CC2: burdensome a 3.496 2.004 0.928 64,259
CC3: costly a 2.714 1.918 0.833 26,234
Perceived Cost of Noncompliance 
My noncompliance with the requirements of the CP would 
_____. 
CNC1: be harmful to me a 5.933 1.609 0.968 63,241
CNC2: impact me negatively a 5.812 1.691 0.979 98,773
CNC3: create disadvantages for me a 5.739 1.729 0.975 104,490
Work Impediment 
Complying with the requirements of the CP _____. 
WI1: holds me back from doing my actual work a 2.790 1.789 0.950 63,627
WI2: slows down my response time to my colleagues, custom-
ers, managers, etc.
a 2.874 1.829 0.972 122,200
WI3: hinders my productivity at work a 2.826 1.814 0.967 106,489
Intrinsic Costs
If I don’t comply with the requirements of the CP. it would make 
me feel _____.
IC1: bad a 4.748 2.030 0.943 74,199
IC2: dissatisﬁ ed a 4.514 2.009 0.948 52,050
IC3: unaccomplished a 3.916 2.069 0.890 30,769
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 A P P E N D I X  A  Continued
Dimensions & Questions Scale Average STD Loading t -Value
Sanctions
_____ I don’t comply with the requirements of the CP.
S1: I will probably be punished or demoted if a 4.966 2.029 0.935 82,540
S2: I will receive personal reprimand in oral or written assess-
ment reports if
a 5.067 1.999 0.890 25,230
S3: I will incur monetary or non-monetary penalties if a 4.008 2.227 0.864 25,701
Behavior Detection
BD1: How much attention does your supervisor pay to whether 
or not you comply with the requirements of the CP?
a 5.143 2.056 0.970 12,258
BD2: How easily is it for your supervisor to observe whether 
you comply with the requirements of the CP?
a 4.143 2.047 0.770 5,017
BD3: How much does your supervisor care whether you do 
your job well?
a 3.496 1.995 0.487 1,631
Scale:
a 1 = Strongly Disagree – 7 = Strongly Agree
b 1 = Almost Never; 2 = Very Rarely; 3 = Rarely; 4 = Occasionally; 5 = Frequently; 6 = Very Frequently; 7 = Almost Always
c 1 = Extremely; 2 = Quite; 3 = Slightly; 4 = Neither; 5 = Slightly; 6 = Quite; 7 = Extremely
Abbreviation: STD = Standard deviation.
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